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ZONING AND THE COMPLICATED RELIANCE ON RESTRICTIVE 
COVENANTS 




Zoning decisions remain among the most significant policy choices a 
local government can make, as they can directly change the very character of 
an area. Since the advent of Euclidean zoning,1 local zoning schemes have 
divided a municipality into districts that segregate residential, business, 
industrial, agricultural, and other categories of uses from each other.2 Once 
 
∗ Dennis A. Kerbel is an Assistant County Attorney and the Chief of the Zoning, Land Use & 
Environment Section of the Miami-Dade County Attorney’s Office. Dennis is a litigator who has 
practiced in federal and state court, at both the trial and appellate levels.  Dennis handles a broad 
variety of cases, including challenges to County ordinances, appeals of land use decisions, 
enforcement actions, and federal civil rights claims.  In addition, Dennis is responsible for drafting 
and review of ordinances, resolutions, and contracts. He also advises the Board of County 
Commissioners and other County boards on public hearings involving land use matters.  The views 
expressed herein are his own. 
1  Named, not for the mathematical system, but for Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U.S. 365 (1926), which gave constitutional approval to this type of regulation. 
2  See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394–95. The U.S. Supreme Court deferred to the determinations of 
local legislatures that zoning ordinances were constitutional uses of the police power to protect “the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare” and that the separation of a municipality into distinct 
districts within which certain uses were prohibited was not “arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. at 395. The 
Court specifically affirmed the exclusion of apartment buildings from single-family detached homes, 
based on criteria that have been a staple of local zoning ordinances since then: 
The matter of zoning has received much attention at the hands of commissions 
and experts, and the results of their investigations have been set forth in 
comprehensive reports. These reports . . . concur in the view that the segregation 
of residential, business and industrial buildings will make it easier to provide fire 
apparatus suitable for the character and intensity of the development in each 
section; that it will increase the safety and security of home life, greatly tend to 
prevent street accidents, especially to children, by reducing the traffic and 
resulting confusion in residential sections, decrease noise and other conditions 
which produce or intensify nervous disorders, preserve a more favorable 
environment in which to rear children, etc. With particular reference to apartment 
houses, it is pointed out that the development of detached house sections is greatly 
retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in 
destroying the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very 
often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take 
advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the 
residential character of the district. Moreover, the coming of one apartment house 
is followed by others, interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation 
of air and monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon the 
smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments, the disturbing 
noises incident to increased traffic and business, and the occupation, by means of 
moving and parked automobiles, of larger portions of the streets, thus detracting 
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the zoning scheme is established, a local government is generally obligated 
to assign each parcel of land to one of these general zoning districts.3 The 
strict division of a municipality into specific and distinct zones has 
presented its own unique challenges, because the life of a city is not always 
so easily divisible into boxes. Yet, the Florida Supreme Court has long 
interpreted the (otherwise correct) prohibition on contracting away the 
police power—referred to in this context as unlawful “contract zoning”4—
to also restrict a local government from imposing site-specific conditions 
when reassigning the zoning district applicable to a property—referred to as 
“conditional zoning” (or, more precisely, “conditional rezoning”).5 
Consequently, zoning boards considering rezonings are generally 
obligated to consider, not any one particular use that may be made of a 
property, but rather the application of the proposed Euclidean district 
generally. But zoning boards often want assurances as to what, exactly, they 
are approving to be done on a property (albeit without running afoul of the 
prohibition on direct control of property6). And zoning applicants, who need 
regulatory approval to undertake their projects, want to assure the 
respective zoning boards and the interested community members who 
support or object to those projects that the applicants will adhere to the 
representations they make to the public. 
Over the last several decades, one common mechanism applicants have 
used to address these issues, while avoiding the prohibition on contract 
zoning and restrictions on conditional rezoning, has been to voluntarily 
proffer a restrictive covenant (or declaration of restrictions—the terms are 
 
from their safety and depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces 
for play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities-until, finally, the residential 
character of the neighborhood and its desirability as a place of detached 
residences are utterly destroyed. Under these circumstances, apartment houses, 
which in a different environment would be not only entirely unobjectionable but 
highly desirable, come very near to being nuisances. 
Id. at 394–95. 
3 See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); Debes v. City of Key West, 690 So. 2d 
700, 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); Porpoise Point P’ship v. St. Johns Cty., 470 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 5th 
DCA 1985). 
4 See Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89 (“A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract 
with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance subject to various covenants and 
restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement to be executed between the city and the property owner.”); 
Chung v. Sarasota Cty., 686 So. 2d 1358, 1359 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“Contract zoning” refers to an 
agreement between a property owner and a local government where the owner agrees to certain 
conditions in return for the government’s rezoning or enforceable promise to rezone.). 
5 Zoning and rezoning decisions are distinguished from other zoning actions, such as variances, 
conditional uses, and other exceptions, reviews, and interpretations of zoning ordinances. See infra Part 
III. 
6 See, e.g., Debes, 690 So. 2d at 702; Porpoise Point P’ship, 470 So. 2d at 851. 
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used interchangeably) during a rezoning hearing.7 The covenant may be an 
inducement to approve the rezoning, but because it is presented during the 
zoning hearing itself and not in a separate proceeding, it does not represent 
the illegal contracting away of the police power.8 And, because the 
covenant is voluntarily imposed by the property owner, it is not a condition 
of the rezoning. The covenant thereafter becomes part of the zoning 
regulations governing the property.9 
But, because covenants are rooted in law governing private property 
transactions, they present challenges when used as regulatory zoning 
instruments. Covenants may be enforced as local regulations, but they are 
legal instruments to which the law also attaches unique theories of redress. 
To be binding,  covenants  require  certain  formalities  that  do  not apply to 
other zoning regulations. For example, all property owners and mortgagees 
must execute  the  instrument.  In addition, depending  on  the terms of the 
covenant, amending or deleting the covenant may require not only the 
normal zoning hearing process, but also the approval of the parties who  
created  the covenant  and  any  other  parties  who  are given  rights  to 
enforce  the covenant.  Such requirements may present  unique  challenges. 
For example, if a covenant applies to property that is sold off into numerous 
condominium units without granting a condominium association the 
authority to approve modifications,10 then the local government’s approval 
 
7 Local governments also have the option to adopt and apply new zoning ordinances––sometimes 
referred to as “form-based codes”––that provide for mixed-use developments and do away with the strict 
Euclidean districts. See, e.g., Code of Miami-Dade County, Florida, Ch. 33, art. XXXIII(I)–(V); Miami 
21 Code, City of Miami. But, rewriting a local zoning code is a significant undertaking that requires 
extensive use of professional resources and community hearings to determine the right mix of uses for 
the subject area. See generally TERRY E. LEWIS ET AL., SPOT ZONING, CONTRACT ZONING, AND 
CONDITIONAL ZONING, 2 FLA. ENVTL. & LAND USE L. 9-1 (1994) (“Conditional zoning is gaining 
acceptance in Florida as a desirable means to ameliorate the rigidity of Euclidean zoning. . . . This 
process employs tools such as impact and planned unit development zoning. With impact zoning, 
development type and density are included in the zoning ordinance. Planning flexibility and creativity 
are encouraged. Strict lot line, floor space, curb, gutter, and sideyard requirements are relaxed.”). 
8 See, e.g., Walberg v. Metro. Dade County, 296 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). 
9 Save Calusa Trust v. St. Andrews Holdings, Ltd., 193 So. 3d 910 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (“[T]he 
duly imposed restrictive covenant in this case is a governmental regulation, rather than an estate, 
interest, claim or charge affecting the marketability of the property’s title. . . .”), reh’g denied (June 6, 
2016), review denied, SC16-1189, 2016 WL 7474142 (Fla. Dec. 29, 2016); Metro. Dade Cty. v. 
Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007–08 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (The County 
Commission approved the rezoning of the property to a commercial district, but the zoning resolution 
“clearly expressed that the county commission granted rezoning only for a bank or savings and loan and 
accepted the property owner’s offer of a restrictive covenant and the county’s option to enforce this 
restriction.”). 
10 See generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163 
(1999) (“[I]t may be easier for zoning regulators to allow more fragmentation later than for individuals 
to turn the ratchet back and reassemble land.”); Julia D. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and 
the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002) (noting the risks in use of conservation easements 
because of the “nontrivial” expenditures that may arise in “reassembling fragmented property rights”). 
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of the covenant release may not be sufficient to remove the restriction if the 
covenant’s modification term requires the consent of all of the property 
owners. 
Given the complexities that zoning covenants present, it is time to 
revisit the legal underpinnings of the system that restricted the use of 
conditional rezonings, so that regulatory hearings before local government 
boards do not become unnecessarily embroiled in ancillary issues 
concerning ownership of real property.11 
 
I.?ZONING AND REZONING AS LEGISLATIVE ACTS 
 
Local governments have the authority to enact zoning laws and 
regulations under their “police power, asserted for the public welfare.”12 
Traditional Euclidean zoning divides a municipality into general zoning 
districts of varying intensities—for example, single-family residential, 
multi-family residential (usually, apartments), neighborhood-serving 
business, liberal business, light industrial, heavy industrial, agriculture—
and assigns each parcel of land to one of those districts. In earlier times, the 
decision to zone or rezone a parcel was considered to be a legislative act, 
and both the original enacting legislation and any subsequent rezoning 
actions were reviewed under the “fairly debatable” standard.13 
The leading case was the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in City of 
Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1953). Lachman concerned 
owners of eighty-six lots whose application to rezone their beachfront 
properties from a single-family residential district to a district that permitted 
apartment houses and hotels had been denied.14 At that time, a challenge to 
 
11  This article does not address development agreements adopted pursuant to the Florida Local 
Government Development Agreement Act (sections 163.3220–163.3243, Florida Statutes). 
12  Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387–88 (1926); see also Forde v. 
City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1941) (“[I]t is no longer questioned that a municipality, 
acting under legislative authority, may be vested with the power to enact a valid zoning ordinance and 
that a general attack thereon will ordinarily fail; nor is it questioned that the right of an urban owner to 
the free use of his property may be regulated by a legitimate exercise of the police power, and when so 
asserted, fairly and impartially in the interest of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, the 
courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the public officials duly authorized in the premises 
unless it clearly appears that their action has no just foundation in reason and necessity [i.e., the ‘fairly 
debatable’ rule].”). 
13  City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So. 2d 148, 152–53 (Fla. 1953) (“There is no showing 
here of confiscation. It may or may not be that some owners will suffer a reduction in price if they sell 
before the city in its discretion changes the zoning plan. After all, that is the matter of greatest 
importance, and it is a debatable question. It cannot be solved by looking at one man’s property, but 
must be resolved by a contemplation of the whole picture. So considered, we find no abuse of 
discretion.”). 
14  Id. at 149–50. 
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a zoning decision was by original action; thus, the owners sued to enjoin the 
city from enforcing the single-family residential zone on their properties. A 
trial was held, evidence was produced, and the trial court determined that 
the zoning ordinance “was unreasonable and not ‘fairly debatable.’” The 
Florida Supreme Court looked principally to Village of Euclid to determine 
the applicable standard of review for rezoning decisions and held, “An 
ordinance may be said to be fairly debatable when for any reason it is open 
to dispute or controversy on grounds that make sense or point to a logical 
deduction that in no way involves its constitutional validity.”15 This 
standard is based on separation of powers principles, as the Court further 
noted: “If such a deduction supports the city’s contention that to remove the 
present zoning restrictions would destroy the entire zoning scheme and 
bring about the evils contended by the city, then the Court should not 
substitute its judgment for that of the City Council.”16 
For the ensuing decades, rezoning decisions in Florida, whether by 
ordinance or resolution, were considered to be legislative decisions. As 
such, they were to be reviewed through the filing of “[s]uits in equity 
seeking injunctive relief against a zoning ordinance or resolution on the 
ground that it is arbitrary, capricious, confiscatory or impinges on some 
right or guarantee of the Constitution of this State.”17 But, the adoption of 
the rezoning ordinance was not subject to any more heightened standard or 
procedure than the adoption of any other ordinance.18 
 
15  Id. at 152. 
16  Id. 
17  Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963) (“It has been uniformly held in this 
state that the function of a board or commission in the enactment of zoning ordinances is a purely 
legislative function. The decisions on this subject dispel any contention that a zoning ordinance or 
resolution is quasi-judicial in character.”) (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Schauer v. City of Miami 
Beach, 112 So. 2d 838, 839 (Fla. 1959) (“It is obvious to us that the enactment of the original zoning 
ordinance was a legislative function and we cannot reason that the amendment of it was of different 
character.”); Palm Beach Cty. v. Tinnerman, 517 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987) (“[C]lassification 
of lands under zoning ordinances involves the exercise of legislative power. Thus, the doctrine of 
separation of powers prevents the courts from interfering with such exercise. Therefore, a court order 
which directs the zoning authority to zone a property in a particular manner violates the separation of 
powers doctrine.”); City of Jacksonville Beach v. Grubbs, 461 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) 
(“[T]he zoning authority’s decision should have been reviewed under the traditional ‘fairly debatable’ 
standard of review and . . . neither the comprehensive plan nor the proposed zoning ordinance supported 
reversal below. . . . [T]he city produced evidence that its decision was related to the health, safety, 
welfare and morals of the community and there was no competent evidence that plaintiff was deprived 
of reasonable beneficial use of the property.”); Dade Cty. v. Markoe, 164 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1964) (“The entire thrust of the petition is directed to the lack of authority in the commission to rescind, 
by its second resolution, the first resolution which rezoned the property. The circuit court found, and we 
think correctly, that the action of the commission in enacting the second resolution was legislative in 
character. This being so, there was nothing to review, for only those decisions which have a judicial or 
quasi-judicial character are subject, in [certiorari] proceedings . . . , to review.”). 
18  The Florida Supreme Court would later recede from this principle and determine that 
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The underlying premise of the Euclidean system is to prevent one 
category of uses from encroaching on another, but the emphasis on general 
categories restricts a local government’s ability to tailor a rezoning to the 
unique features that may have developed in a surrounding neighborhood 
over time.19 As the Florida Supreme Court long ago determined in Hartnett 
v. Austin, the first priority in evaluating rezonings is whether it maintains 
the “uniformity” of the zoning scheme and its “well-defined classes of 
uses.”20 Indeed, under Florida law, it has even been held to be improper to 
consider the particular use a property owner wants to make of his property: 
A property owner is entitled to have his property properly 
zoned based on proper zoning concepts without regard to 
the one particular use which the owner might then intend to 
make of the various uses permitted under a proper zoning 
classification. A zoning authority’s insistence on  
considering the owner’s specific use of a parcel of land 
constitutes not zoning but direct governmental control of 
the actual use of each parcel of land which is inconsistent 
with constitutionally guaranteed private property rights.21 
Deviating from the uniform system was considered to be arbitrary and 
capricious and thus a basis to invalidate the rezoning decision.22 
The downside of this rigid system is that it makes it difficult for a local 
government to address a situation where a proposed zoning district would 
permit some uses that are compatible with surrounding properties, but 
would include other uses that may not be compatible. For example, a 
modern warehouse and showroom development that is permitted in a light 
industrial district and is not otherwise permitted in a commercial district 
might be appropriately located next to a single-family neighborhood if 
developed with noise attenuation and buffering, but other industrial uses 
that are permitted within the same district might not be compatible with the 
 
rezonings are quasi-judicial decisions. See infra Part IV. 
19  See generally ARDEN H. RATHKOPF ET AL., THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 44:3 (4th 
ed. Apr. 2017 Update) (“Unnecessary and unchecked reliance on rezoning with conditions will 
invariably exacerbate the problems of ad hocery and uncontrolled discretion that have long plagued the 
zoning process. When utilized as a substitute for planning and a well drafted zoning code, the practice of 
rezoning with conditions threatens to undercut even the modicum of the ‘rule of law’ that might be 
embodied in a formally structured adjudicatory permit land use regulatory system.”). 
20  See, e.g., Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956). 
21  Porpoise Point P’ship v. St. Johns Cty., 470 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); see also 
Debes v. City of Key West, 690 So. 2d 700, 702 (quoting Porpoise Point P’ship and holding that city’s 
desire to retain property for promotion of affordable housing was an impermissible basis to reject 
rezoning to commercial district of a property that was otherwise completely surrounded by properties 
zoned and developed for commercial uses). 
22  Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89 (“Such is certainly not consonant with our notion of government by 
rule of law that affects alike all similarly conditioned.”). 
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surrounding neighborhood.23 Conversely, imbalances can arise where “land 
on the periphery of a highly restricted zone . . . feel[s] the impact of uses 
maintained in an adjacent and less restricted zone . . . more heavily . . . 
than . . . other land in the same district”; pressure then mounts to 
“reclassif[y] land lying on the borderline of a district” because of the 
“unequal hardship” on properties that are otherwise classified within the 
same zoning district.24 
One method local governments have unsuccessfully used to address 
unique zoning considerations for a particular site is so-called “contract 
zoning,” which is illegal. Contract zoning entails a municipality “enter[ing] 
into a private contract with a property owner for the amendment of a zoning 
ordinance subject to various covenants and restrictions in a collateral deed 
or agreement to be executed between the city and the property owner.”25 
Most egregious is when a municipality has adopted a contract that commits 
it in advance to rezone the property in a later proceeding, but the contract 
was entered into without the strictures of either a zoning hearing or the 
process attendant to amending an ordinance.26 Contract zoning is a violation 
of the “long established principle that a municipality cannot contract away 
the exercise of its police powers.”27 
 
23  Cf. Kemp v. Miami-Dade Cty., Case No. 13-009GM, Recommended Order (Fla. Div. Admin. 
Hr’gs Aug. 1, 2013), adopted in Final Order No. DEO-13-091 (Fla. Dept. of Econ. Opportunity Sept. 
24, 2013). This case concerned a comprehensive plan amendment, not a rezoning, but because the issues 
were resolved through the acceptance of a restrictive covenant addressing noise attenuation, buffering, 
and other compatibility issues, it serves as a useful illustration of the complexities that can arise in land-
use applications. 
24  PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICA LAW OF ZONING § 9:20 (5th ed. 2014). 
25  Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89. 
26  Chung v. Sarasota Cty., 686 So. 2d 1358, 1359–60 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) (“One of the reasons 
contract zoning is generally rejected is because ‘[t]he legislative power to enact and amend zoning 
regulations requires due process, notice, and hearings,’” whereas other legislative acts do not) (quoting 
Terry Lewis et al., Spot Zoning, Contract Zoning, & Conditional Zoning, in FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL 
& LAND USE LAW §§ 9-1, 9-13 (James J. Brown ed., 2d ed. 1994)). 
27  Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 89 (Fla. 1956); see generally RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 
19, at § 44:10 (“Contract rezoning today is considered illegal largely on the ground that exercise of the 
zoning power pursuant to a bilateral agreement between a developer and a municipality unlawfully 
bargains away the municipality’s police power.”). Requiring the approval of neighbors or a 
homeowner’s association before a zoning resolution can be adopted presents similar issues of whether 
the police power has been unlawfully delegated. Pollard v. Palm Beach Cty., 560 So. 2d 1358, 1360 
(Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“[O]pinions of residents are not factual evidence and not a sound basis for denial 
of a zoning change application.”); City of Apopka v. Orange Cty., 299 So. 2d 657, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1974) (“The objections of a large number of residents of the affected neighborhood are not a sound basis 
for the denial of a permit.”); Town of Ponce Inlet v. Rancourt, 627 So. 2d 586, 588 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) 
(“The agreement of neighbors should not be a sufficient or sound basis to allow a variance although it 
could be a consideration in a close case. Neighbors and their attitudes change from time to time while 
the variance does not.”); Op. Att’y Gen. Fla. 2012-32 (2012) (“[A]n ordinance which delegates the 
legislative power vested in the county commission to determine the public policy and regulate property 
rights based on the written consent of all or a majority of the specified landowners and homeowners 
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Another tailoring method is known as “conditional zoning,” which 
refers to a “zoning amendment [i.e., a rezoning] which permits a use of 
particular property in a zoning district subject to restrictions other than 
those applicable to all land similarly classified.”28 Conditional zoning, 
which has been permitted in other states,29 permits rezoning decisions to 
better address situations in which “[u]navoidably, districts with unlike 
restrictions abut one another.”30 Through conditional zoning, local 
governments can address the resulting imbalance31 and can thus avoid a 
continuing cycle of “hardship, petition, and relief.”32 
One objection to conditional zoning is that it can become “illegal spot 
zoning,” meaning a rezoning that creates a small island of property that 
allows significantly more liberal uses than that of surrounding properties— 
“solely for the benefit of a particular property owner.”33 The concern is that 
conditional zoning creates “a clear incentive on the part of local officials to 
substitute ‘zoning by negotiation’ for a well planned and standardized 
zoning code.”34 But this concern is an overinflated outgrowth of courts’ 
preference for uniformity in a Euclidean system and may even be a case of 
 
prior to accepting an application for rezoning might well be seen by a court as an invalid delegation of 
the legislative power of the county.”). But see infra note 102. 
28  Broward Cty. v. Griffey, 366 So. 2d 869, 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (quoting R. ANDERSON, 
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.20 (2d ed. 1976)) (holding that County’s land-use approval was not 
unlawful as conditional zoning, because the stipulated right-of-way exactions were no different than 
would be required of similarly-zoned properties); M. Henning, Land Use—Goffinet v. Christian County: 
New Flexibility In Illinois Zoning Law, 8 LOYOLA U.L.J. 642 (1977). This is distinct from a “conditional 
use permit” or “special use permit,” in which particular uses are only permitted in certain zoning 
districts upon a showing, at a public hearing, that applicable criteria are satisfied. See, e.g., Palm Beach 
Polo, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, 918 So. 2d 988, 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (approving Planned Unit 
Development, which is “a zoning device used to permit flexibility in design and use of property” 
consisting of “an agreement between the land owner and the zoning authority, and the terms of 
development are negotiated between the parties in accordance with the conditions set forth in the 
governing ordinances”); Nostimo, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 594 So. 2d 779, 780 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) 
(approving request for a “conditional use permit . . . to sell beer and wine for off premises 
consumption”); Alachua Cty. v. Eagle’s Nest Farms, Inc., 473 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) 
(approving special use permit for a private airstrip). 
29  Arizona, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and 
Virginia authorize some form of conditional rezoning without requiring creation of a new zoning 
category. See RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 44:4. 
30  SALKIN, supra note 24, at § 9:20. 
31  Id. 
32  Id.; see also RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 44:12 (“Generally, state courts uphold 
conditional rezoning so long as the rezoning: (1) promotes the general welfare and not merely private 
interests; (2) the rezoning does not otherwise constitute illegal spot zoning; (3) the conditions imposed 
are reasonable and not otherwise illegal; and (4) there is no express agreement bargaining away a 
municipality’s future use of the police power.”). 
33  City Comm’n of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So. 2d 1227, 1240 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1989). 
34  RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 44:3; see also infra note 51. 
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courts improperly substituting their policy judgments as super-zoning 
boards.35 Moving away from the suburban development model that 
underlies the Euclidean system means recognizing that some locations that 
may be appropriate for more intense or different uses than the surrounding 
properties; but the existing zoning categories may not provide an 
appropriate mix of uses; and rewriting the zoning code or creating new 
categories may not be an appropriate or feasible solution. Conditional 
zoning is actually more likely to ameliorate the “spot” effect, because it 
would allow the appropriate introduction of different uses while also 
limiting the potential incompatibility with the surrounding areas. Thus, 
conditional rezoning would permit a more orderly change of neighborhood 
character over time, rather than the abrupt change that can result after 
piecemeal rezonings to new districts.36 
In the 1956 decision of Hartnett v. Austin, the Florida Supreme Court 
merged the objections to “contract zoning” with the objections to 
“conditional zoning” and put a stop to using either vehicle to vary from the 
“uniformity” requirement of Euclidean zoning. Hartnett concerned a 
decision to rezone a property from a single-family residential district to a 
commercial district, “subject to and dependent upon the full and complete 
observance of the limitations, restrictions and other requirements” generally 
described in the ordinance but to be effectuated through the subsequent 
execution of a contract between the city and the property owner. The 
rezoning ordinance prescribed that the contract would address the following 
conditions: 
(1) a ‘Bay Point type wall’ shall be placed around the 
perimeter of the property not less than 40 feet inside the 
property line abutting certain streets; (2) the 40-foot strip 
shall at all times be kept and maintained in a condition 
 
35  S. A. Healy Co. v. Town of Highland Beach, 355 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (“The 
Courts are not empowered to act as super zoning boards substituting their judgment for that of the 
legislative and administrative bodies exercising legitimate objectives.”). 
36  See, e.g., Woodlawn Park Cemetery, 553 So. 2d at 1233 (“Running through all of these cases 
is the court’s determination that it is entirely arbitrary and not at all ‘fairly debatable’ on grounds that 
make sense for the governing authority to allow for an entire transformation of the character of an area 
through extensive rezoning of all nearby properties—and then to deny the subject property owner equal 
treatment, although similarly situated. It is thought to be confiscatory of a person’s property in such 
cases to prevent a property owner from utilizing his property in a certain way, when virtually all of his 
adjoining neighbors are not subject to such a restriction. Often, as previously noted, the courts refer to 
such arbitrary refusals to rezone as ‘reverse spot zoning’ because the refusal to rezone the subject 
property creates, in effect, a veritable zoning island [as in Tollius], or a zoning peninsula [as in Manilow 
and Olive], in a surrounding sea of contrary zoning classification. In these cases, the courts have 
reasoned that a governing authority, although having large discretionary zoning power, may not, under 
the guise of its police power, discriminate in such a blatant fashion against a property owner—as such 
arbitrary governmental action violates the property owner’s constitutional right to make legitimate use 
of his land.”). 
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prescribed by the City Commission at the expense of the 
property owner; (3) suitable contracts shall be entered into 
between the city and the property owner covering the above 
requirements and also providing for control of lights on the 
premises in order to bring about ‘as little glare and 
disturbance’ as possible to the people in the neighborhood 
(this expense was to be borne by the property owner); 
(4) the property owner should furnish and pay for adequate 
police protection within the rezoned area; (5) to submit to 
the City Commission for approval plans and specifications 
of any proposed building; and (6) the property owner shall 
not open access to certain abutting streets.37 
Notably, these types of conditions frequently accompany approvals of site-
specific zoning approvals such as variances and exceptions.38 
The Florida Supreme Court nevertheless rejected the rezoning, because 
of the conditions and the need for a subsequent agreement to address the 
impacts of the proposed commercial use on surrounding residential 
properties. The Court held, “In exercising its zoning powers the 
municipality must deal with well-defined classes of uses. If each parcel of 
property were zoned on the basis of variables that could enter into private 
contracts then the whole scheme and objective of community planning and 
zoning would collapse.”39 The Court further described the purported evils of 
moving away from uniformity: “The zoning classifications of each parcel 
would then be bottomed on individual agreements and private arrangements 
that would totally destroy uniformity. Both the benefits of and reasons for a 
well-ordered comprehensive zoning scheme would be eliminated.”40 The 
Hartnett court was particularly concerned about the need for significant 
terms to be worked out in a separate instrument, and that the rezoning 
ordinance was not complete on its face.41 But, beyond concern about the 
method by which the city had conditioned the rezoning, the Hartnett court 
appears to have been principally concerned with Euclidean zoning 
principles of uniformity over flexibility. 
The Florida Supreme Court’s reticence about conditional rezoning and 
its emphasis on the “uniformity” of a zoning code were also rooted in older 
 
37  Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 88 (Fla. 1956). 
38  See infra Part IV. 
39  Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. at 88 (“The provisions of a municipal ordinance which conditions its effectiveness upon 
the necessity for the subsequent execution of a contract with private parties such as was done in the case 
at bar cannot be held to provide the degree of clarity and certainty that is required of municipal 
legislation.”). 
02-KERBEL 5.9.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/17  6:15 PM 
2017] Restrictive Covenants  273 
notions that neighbors had vested rights in the zoning of other properties.42 
Hence, the Hartnett court expressed concern that “[t]he residential owner 
would never know when he was protected against commercial 
encroachment” and that “[t]he commercial establishments . . . would never 
know when they had protection against . . . smoke and noise producing 
industries.”43 But the Florida Supreme Court later receded from the 
suggestion that one can be vested to a zoning scheme.44 The court 
specifically receded from Hartnett on this point, holding that “a rule of 
estoppel cannot be read into such decisions as that of Hartnett v. Austin . . . 
that a neighboring owner had a ‘right to a continuation of’ existing zoning 
conditions sufficient to allow contest of an amendment by such party.”45 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on preserving the Euclidean system remained, 
primarily reflected in courts’ decisions invalidating zoning decisions by 
classifying them as “spot zoning” or “reverse spot zoning.”46 
Despite the legal preference for uniformity in a zoning code, the need 
to address the unique features or surrounding context of a particular parcel 
or group of parcels has not gone away, in this or any other jurisdiction. But, 
following Hartnett, the approval of a general zoning classification should 
be complete on its face, and rezonings should not have unique conditions.47 
 
42  Hartnett, 93 So. 2d at 89. 
43  Id. 
44  Oka v. Cole, 145 So. 2d 233, 235 (Fla. 1962) (finding “no authority . . . that vested rights can 
accrue to neighboring owners, or that ordinances altering zoning restrictions are to be tested by any 
standard other than that applicable to zoning classification generally”) (footnotes omitted). 
45  Id.; see also New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe Cty., 95 F. 3d 1084, 1090 (11th Cir. 1996) 
(“Because there is no general constitutional right to be free from all changes in land-use laws, . . . 
[plaintiff] must do more than rely on the original zoning to establish an equitable estoppel.”). 
46  See, e.g., City of Miami Beach v. Robbins, 702 So. 2d 1329, 1330 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) 
(prohibiting downzoning of “three blocks” to lower density residential category where “the surrounding 
property was ‘a vast sea of [higher density districts] and other types of zoning’”); City Comm’n of City 
of Miami v. Woodlawn Park Cemetery Co., 553 So. 2d 1227, 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (requiring 
rezoning of residential parcel to commercial zone because surrounding properties had been granted 
similar rezoning over time); Porpoise Point P’ship v. St. Johns Cty., 470 So. 2d 850, 851 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1985); Kugel v. City of Miami Beach, 206 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (rejecting, as “arbitrary 
and unreasonable and . . . confiscatory,” continued zoning of property under residential category––even 
though area north of subject property retained residential category––because of commercial zoning and 
commercial development on remainder of surrounding properties). 
47  Of course, rezonings may in fact have been approved with unique conditions; but if such 
actions were not reversed on appeal, then they would remain valid today despite Hartnett and its 
progeny. Any challenges to the legality of a unique condition on rezoning would be subject to the 
jurisdictional limits on untimely appeals. Peltz v. Dist. Ct. of App., 3d Dist., 605 So. 2d 865, 866 (Fla. 
1992) (“The untimely filing of a notice of appeal precludes the appellate court from exercising 
jurisdiction.”); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Peart, 843 So. 2d 363, 364 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003). The failure to 
timely seek review of a zoning action would bar further challenges to that action. See State ex rel. 
Sarasota Cty. v. Boyer, 360 So. 2d 388, 393 (Fla. 1978) (“As a general rule . . . matters determined in an 
order which has become final without appeal are not later subject to appellate review simply because a 
later order affected those matters or applied them to other interlocutory matters under 
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Therefore, the only way to make certain that representations made in 
support of a rezoning are enforceable is through the use of one of the oldest 
forms of land-use control—a declaration of restrictive covenants.48 This 
mechanism allows a zoning applicant to impose voluntary restrictions on 
his or her own property through a covenant, which the zoning board can 
consider in approving the rezoning and can subsequently enforce. 
In Walberg v. Metro. Dade County, 296 So. 2d 509, 511 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1974), the Third District distinguished Hartnett and accepted that voluntary 
restrictions announced in a rezoning hearing—albeit not proffered as a 
recordable covenant—are proper zoning considerations. Walberg concerned 
a County-initiated “downzoning,” to rezone a property from a multi-family 
zoning district to one of lower population density. At the hearing, the 
property owner made representations to the zoning board regarding its 
planned development of the property, to encourage denial of the rezoning. 
The board rejected the rezoning, and two neighbors appealed. In holding 
that the property owner’s representations were a valid zoning consideration 
and did not constitute illegal contract zoning, the court distinguished 
Hartnett: “it does not appear from this record that a private contract was 
made by the County with a property owner for a change or perpetuation of 
zoning.”49 Instead, “the most that can be said . . . is that the Commissioners 
may have been influenced by representations made by South Cutler [the 
developer who benefited from a denial of the proposed downzoning].” 
From this, the Court held, “[a] rule which would forbid owners from 
announcing concessions to the public interest in any proceeding before a 
zoning authority would not be in the best interest of the public,” and the 
 
consideration. . . .”); Atl. Shores Resort, LLC v. 507 S. St. Corp., 937 So. 2d 1239, 1243–44 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2006) (holding that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of issues before architectural review 
commission); Paresky, 893 So. 2d at 665–66 (holding that collateral estoppel applies to zoning 
proceedings); Miller v. Booth, 702 So. 2d 290, 291 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (affirming County’s decision to 
deny zoning application under “administrative res judicata” based on failure to show “substantial change 
in circumstances”). Similarly, an original action to challenge a zoning decision would be subject to the 
“catch-all” statute of limitations for challenges to local government ordinances or resolutions, which is 4 
years from the date of adoption. See Milan Inv. Group, Inc. v. City of Miami, 50 So. 3d 662, 664 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2011); Paresky v. Miami-Dade County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 893 So. 2d 664, 665 (Fla. 3d DCA 
2005). 
48  See Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“The code 
creates various zoning categories, including the BU–1A, Limited Business District, section 33–246 
Dade County Code, which is the basic set of regulations applicable to the subject property. If 
unrestricted, this category would permit a gas station on the subject property. Additionally, however, are 
the sections providing for further restrictions as to specific properties. Thus section 33–33 of the code 
provides that applications ‘may be granted subject to all reasonable restrictions and conditions deemed 
necessary.’ This power to subject property to further restriction is emphasized in section 33–315 of the 
code where the board of county commissioners is authorized to ‘take final action upon any and all 
matters and requests contained in the application. . . .”). 
49  Walberg, 296 So. 2d at 511. 
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record did not show “that the Commission failed to consider the public’s 
interest or acted upon the basis of a private contract.”50 
At base, the key difference between contract zoning, conditional 
zoning, and voluntary zoning covenants involves the method by which the 
conditions are made binding. In pure contract zoning, bilateral promises are 
made: both the local government and the applicant are bound to perform 
specific actions. In conditional rezoning, the property is rezoned with 
conditions not applicable to all properties in the same zoning district, which 
would be inconsistent with Hartnett’s uniformity requirement (even if, in 
the modern era, unique conditions may better address the blighting 
influences that Euclid assumed imposing strict zoning districts would 
correct). By contrast, with voluntary zoning covenants, the proffering party 
binds itself to its own promises, but the local government is not required to 
accept the offer; and the property is ultimately rezoned (or not, as in 
Walberg) based on the uniform zoning scheme, while the zoning covenant 
provides an additional layer of regulation that the local government can 
enforce. But covenants come with their own unique legal requirements that 
can dramatically affect the zoning process later. 
 
II.  FORMALITIES APPLICABLE TO PRIVATE COVENANTS 
 
Restrictive covenants have been used since before the advent of zoning 
laws.51 A private property owner who seeks to develop and subdivide his or 
her property imposes restrictions for the benefit of all purchasers, and those 
restrictions bind and run with each separate parcel of the subdivided land.52 
 
50  Id. 
51  See, e.g., Osius v. Barton, 147 So. 862, 867–68 (Fla. 1933) (“The natural desire of 
householders to secure desirable home surroundings because of the growth of cities and the more 
crowded conditions of modern life, has led to a demand for land limited to development purposes. This 
natural desire has been so exploited by realtors and land companies, that restricted residential property is 
now becoming the rule rather than the exception in our cities. The legal machinery to achieve this end 
has been found in the main not in the ancient rules of easements or covenants, but in the activities of 
courts of equity in preventing fraud and unfair dealing by those who take land with notice of a restriction 
upon its use, so that in equity and good conscience they should not be permitted to act in violation of the 
terms of such restrictions.”); Korn v. Campbell, 192 N.Y. 490, 495–96 (1908); see generally RATHKOPF 
ET AL., supra note 19, at § 1:1 (“As was the case with nuisance doctrine, the American approach to 
restrictive covenants emerged from English common law. . . . American courts were less hostile—
perhaps boosted by a robust land records system and prescriptions as to the form such covenants could 
take. Courts have either abolished or considerably liberalized some of the technical early common law 
requirements for covenants to run with the land and to be enforceable by and against later owners.”). 
52  Stephl v. Moore, 114 So. 455, 455 (Fla. 1927) (“Covenants restraining the free use of real 
property, although not favored in law, will be enforced by the courts when the restriction applies to the 
location of buildings to be erected on the land, and such restrictions are carried in all deeds with a view 
to preserve the symmetry, beauty, and general good of all interested in the scheme of development. The 
benefit of the restrictive covenants inures to each purchaser, irrespective of the time of purchase.”); 
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For example, a restrictive covenant may prohibit commercial enterprises 
within a residential development,53 it may require that residential buildings 
be set back a particular distance from the street,54 or it may prohibit fences 
on waterfront lots.55 The restriction can be contained in the deed of 
conveyance for the property,56 or it can be contained in a separate 
instrument, such as a plat57 or a declaration of restrictions.58 But the 
instrument will be considered a “covenant running with the land,” and not 
merely a covenant personal to an individual owner, if, among other terms, 
“performance of the covenant . . . touch[es] and involve[s] the land or some 
right or easement annexed and appurtenant thereto, and tends necessarily to 
enhance the value of the property or renders it more convenient and 
beneficial to the owner.”59 
In general, restrictive covenants fall into three classes.60 The first class 
are “those which are entered into with the design to carry out a general 
scheme for the improvement or development of real property,” in which 
“the covenant is enforceable by any grantee as against any other, upon the 
theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and consideration, which binds 
each and gives to each the appropriate remedy.”61 The second class are 
“those cases in which the grantor exacts the covenant from his grantee . . . 
for the benefit and protection of contiguous or neighboring lands which the 
former retains,” but in which the grantees “cannot enforce the covenant as 
against each other” and only “the grantor and his assigns of the property 
 
RATHKOPF ET AL., supra note 19, at § 1:1 (“Generally, reciprocal covenants on residential use imposed 
for the benefit of all the land of a common grantor and evidencing a general scheme or plan for 
development and use are enforceable by any later landowner or representative owners’ association for 
whose benefit they were imposed, despite technical common law rules involving ‘privity of estate’ or 
that covenants ‘touch and concern’ the land.”). 
53  See, e.g., Osius, 147 So. at 863–64. 
54  Stephl, 114 So. 455. 
55  Rea v. Brandt, 467 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). 
56  Osius, 147 So. at 863–64. 
57  Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1957) (en banc). 
58  See, e.g., Fiore v. Hilliker, 993 So. 2d 1050, 1051–52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“The restrictions 
did not appear on the face of the deed, but were referred to in the deed as ‘Schedule B’ and were 
recorded in the Lee County public records.”); AC Assocs. v. First Nat. Bank of Florida, 453 So. 2d 1121, 
1123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984) (parking agreement reciprocally affecting two adjacent parcels of real 
property and recorded in public records). 
59  Maule Indus., Inc. v. Sheffield Steel Products, Inc., 105 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); 
see also Bessemer v. Gersten, 381 So. 2d 1344, 1347 (Fla. 1980) (“A developer, in carrying out a 
uniform plan of development for a residential subdivision, may arrange for the provision of services to 
the subdivision or for the maintenance of facilities devoted to common use, and may bind the purchasers 
of homes there to pay for them. In this case, all of the elements of an affirmative covenant running with 
the land have been established.”). 
60  Korn v. Campbell, 192 N.Y. 490, 495–96 (1908); see generally 51 A.L.R. 3d 556 (1973) 
(recognizing Korn as “the leading case on the subject in this country”). 
61  Korn, 192 N.Y. at 495–96. 
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benefited may enforce it against either or all of the grantees.”62 The third 
class are “mutual covenants between owners of adjoining lands, in which 
the restrictions placed upon each produce a corresponding benefit to the 
other, and . . . either party or his assigns may invoke equitable aid to 
restrain a violation of the covenant.”63 
The elements to establish a covenant running with the land are: 
(1) “constructive notice, and intent, expressed in the declaration, that the 
covenant run”; (2) “privity, of contract and estate, between the covenanting 
parties, and succession to the interest of the covenantee by the party seeking 
to enforce”; (3) “a uniform plan of development, with benefit to correspond 
to burden, in that all of the lots in the subdivision were to be charged and 
benefitted,” or, if not uniform or reciprocal, “an agreement creating a 
negative easement or equitable servitude . . . which was contractual in 
nature”; and (4) that “the covenant enhanced the value or enjoyment of the 
property, so it touches and concerns the land.”64 
A private restrictive covenant operates like a contract,65 except that the 
parties seeking to enforce its terms do not necessarily have to be in direct 
privity with one another. When property is subdivided and sold with 
“restrictions on its use pursuant to a general plan of development or 
improvement,” any grantee can enforce the restrictions against any other.66 
This authority rests on “the theory that there is a mutuality of covenant and 
consideration” or, alternatively, on “the ground that mutual negative 
equitable easements are created.”67 Notably, “this doctrine is not dependent 
 
62  Id. 
63  Id. 
64  Bessemer, 381 So. 2d at 1348 n.3 (Fla. 1980) (citing Frumkes v. Boyer, 101 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 
1958); Vetzel v. Brown, 86 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 1956); Volunteer Security Co. v. Dowl, 33 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 
1947); Osius, 147 So. 862; Burdine v. Sewell, 109 So. 648 (Fla. 1926); Armstrong v. Seaboard Air Line 
Ry., 95 So. 506, 510 (Fla. 1922) (Whitfield, J., dissenting); Fiore, 993 So. 2d at 1052–53 (“[I]t is not 
necessary that a restrictive covenant be reciprocal when the division of property was not made pursuant 
to a general scheme or plan. Rather, the restrictive covenant in this case was an agreement creating a 
negative easement or equitable servitude.”); Thompson v. Squibb, 183 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966); 
Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958); Maule Indus., Inc. v. Sheffield Steel Prods., 
Inc., 105 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958); RALPH E. BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 
24.04, at 579–80 (1977). 
65  See Homer v. Dadeland Shopping Ctr., Inc., 229 So. 2d 834, 836 (Fla. 1969) (“An easement 
of way is essentially an inherently legal interest in land, as distinguished from a restriction resulting 
from a restrictive covenant, which is but a creature of equity arising out of contract.”); Wahrendorff, 93 
So. 2d at 722 (en banc) (“[R]estrictive covenants [on a plat] . . . will be recognized and enforced when 
established by contract between the parties involved. . . . [U]pon a severance of title by the grant of one 
or more lots according to the plat and by reference thereto, the restriction then springs into existence and 
becomes binding as between the subdivider and his purchasers and as between the purchasers inter 
sese.”); Fiore, 993 So. 2d 1053 (“[T]he restrictive covenant in this case was an agreement creating a 
negative easement or equitable servitude . . . which was contractual in nature.”). 
66  Hagan v. Sabal Palms, Inc., 186 So. 2d 302, 307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966). 
67  Id. 
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on whether the covenant is to be construed as running with the land.”68 
Furthermore, for private covenants, “it is not necessary that a 
restrictive covenant be reciprocal when the division of property was not 
made pursuant to a general scheme or plan,” as the restrictive covenant 
could instead be “an agreement creating a negative easement or equitable 
servitude . . . which was contractual in nature.”69 Under Florida law, 
“covenants restraining the free use of realty are not favored.”70 Florida 
courts will nonetheless enforce private covenants “to provide the fullest 
liberty of contract and the widest latitude possible in disposition of one’s 
property,” unless the covenants are “contrary to public policy” or 
“contravene any statutory or constitutional provisions,” and provided that 
“the intention is clear and the restraint is within reasonable bounds.”71 
Private restrictive covenants are generally enforced by the private 
parties with rights in the covenant. Indeed, private restrictions can restrict 
the use or development of property even if the use or development would 
otherwise be permitted under applicable zoning regulations.72 Restrictive 
covenants may be enforced in suits of equity by a party for whose benefit 
the restriction was established,73 provided that the “subsequent grantee who 
 
68  Id.; see also Nelle v. Loch Haven Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 413 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 1982) 
(“[A] remote grantee may enforce restrictive covenants against another remote grantee when a common 
grantor intended to create a uniform building plan or scheme of restrictions.”); Silver Blue Lake 
Apartments, Inc. v. Silver Blue Lake Home Owners Ass’n, 245 So. 2d 609, 611 (Fla. 1971) (“Whether a 
restrictive agreement is technically one ‘running with the land’ is material in equity only on the question 
of notice, since if it runs with the land it is binding regardless of notice and, if not, the owner is bound 
only if he takes the land with notice.”). 
69  Fiore, 993 So. 2d 1052–53. 
70  Hagan, 186 So. 2d at 308–09. 
71  Id.; see also Fiore, 993 So. 2d at 1052–53 (holding that building restriction prohibiting 
structures over certain height near river enforceable even though property owner seeking enforcement 
did not have a reciprocal restriction, because building restriction was a “negative easement” imposed as 
a restrictive covenant as a condition of the sale of property); Robins v. Walter, 670 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. 
1st DCA 1995) (holding that bed and breakfast inn in residential development violated deed restriction 
prohibiting ongoing business or commercial use of property and holding, “while we are aware that 
restrictive covenants should be narrowly construed, they should never be construed in a manner that 
would defeat the plain and obvious purpose and intent of the restriction.”). 
72  Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So. 2d 720, 722 (Fla. 1957) (“As to the effect of the rezoning in 
cases such as this [to cancel contractual restrictive covenants], we are of the view that such action by an 
official body is admissible in evidence but it is not conclusive.”); Staninger v. Jacksonville Expressway 
Auth., 182 So. 2d 483, 485 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (“It is well settled that the zoning or rezoning of real 
property cannot in any way abolish, abrogate or enlarge lawful contractual covenants and restrictions 
pertaining thereto.”); Tolar v. Meyer, 96 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957) (“The zoning regulations 
of Dade County, Florida, did not abrogate the restrictions nor impair the lawful contract rights created 
thereby.”). 
73  Osius v. Barton, 147 So. 862, 865 (Fla. 1933) (“The rule is well established that where a 
covenant in a deed provides against certain uses of the property conveyed which may be noxious or 
offensive to the neighborhood, inhabitants, those suffering from a breach of such covenant, though not 
parties to the deed, may be afforded relief in equity upon a showing that the covenant was for their 
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seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant created by a common grantor against 
another subsequent grantee of a separate parcel of realty . . . show[s] that 
the covenant was intended to apply to both parcels.”74 Thus, one resident of 
a subdivision subject to a restrictive covenant requiring a particular setback 
could obtain an injunction to prohibit a second resident from allowing the 
second resident’s home to encroach into the setback on the second 
resident’s property.75 
In general, “interpretation of a contract or a covenant is a matter of 
law” that is governed by “the intentions of the parties,” the “best evidence” 
of which is the “plain language of the contract” or “covenant.”76 
Amendments to a private covenant are subject to a similar analysis, in that 
courts will look first to the express terms of the covenant as to how it may 
be amended.77 Where there is a uniform plan of development, the 
enforceability of amendments is governed not only by the terms of the 
declaration but also by a test of “reasonableness,”78 to ensure that “the 
reserved power be exercised in a reasonable manner so as not to destroy the 
general plan.”79 But private covenants generally require that amendments or 
 
benefit as owners of neighboring properties.”). 
74  Rea v. Brandt, 467 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). 
75  Stephl, 114 So. 455, 455 (Fla. 1927); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1958) (“It was the view of the chancellor that the covenants were for the benefit of all the grantees and 
they could enforce them.”). But see Finchum v. Vogel, 194 So. 2d 49, 52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966) (“The 
possibility of reverter on a condition subsequent is a personal right reserved to the grantor which may be 
enforced only by the grantor, its successors or assigns. It therefore necessarily follows that these so-
called ‘restrictions’ may not be construed as covenants for the benefit of all grantees from the common 
grantor, and no grantee has any rights against any other grantee by way of enforcement which they 
would have in the absence of a reservation of a general power to modify and in the absence of a 
provision for reverter having the effect of a condition subsequent.”) (internal citations omitted). 
76  Royal Oak Landing Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Pelletier, 620 So. 2d 786, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1993). 
77  See, e.g., Holiday Pines Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Wetherington, 596 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1992) (looking to terms “within the contemplation of the grantor and the grantee” and “to the 
documents themselves” for authority to amend covenant); Bay Island Towers, Inc. v. Bay Island-Siesta 
Ass’n, 316 So. 2d 574, 575 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (affirming modification of restrictions to prohibit use of 
land for any use other than single-family dwelling, where modification was approved in accordance with 
modification clause of restriction providing that “restrictions, conditions, covenants and reservations 
may be modified, amended or entirely rescinded by and with the consent of the grantors, their heirs, 
assigns or representatives and a majority of the owners of lots in said subdivision”); Gercas v. Davis, 
188 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (“No release of the restrictions was obtained from the subdivider, 
or any of the residential lot owners in the subdivision. It would seem that under these circumstances a 
release or a modification of the restriction by the owners of the lots so restricted, so as to permit the sale 
of alcoholic beverages, would be a nullity.”). 
78  Wetherington, 596 So. 2d at 87. 
79  Nelle v. Loch Haven Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 413 So. 2d 28, 29 (Fla. 1982) (recognizing that 
“[t]here may be times . . . when the grantor reserves too much power or other factors support a finding 
that a common building plan was not intended.”); Luani Plaza, Inc. v. Burton, 149 So. 3d 712, 715 (Fla. 
3d DCA 2014) (“The Fifth Amendment . . . comprises a reasonable exercise of the amending power of 
the Declaration. . . . It is true that a prohibition on ‘residential use’ is not among the 146 prohibited uses 
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releases be approved by all of the original parties, or their successors, 
unless the covenant specifies a different modification process.80 
Because getting all of the property owners to agree to modify a private 
covenant may be impossible, either because the other owners will not agree 
 
of the project in the Declaration. However, a cursory perusal of these prohibitions, especially when 
considered within the context of the entire document, leaves little doubt the scrivener had but one thing 
in mind—commercial use—at the time of drafting.”), reh’g denied (2014), review denied, 168 So. 3d 
223 (Fla. 2015). 
80  Tolar v. Meyer, 96 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957) (restriction against church use would 
be enforced despite acquiescence of owner-subdivider to use, because “such acquiescence could not and 
would not bind or waive the rights of the other parties to the agreement creating the restrictive 
covenants”); see also In re Heatherwood Holdings, LLC, 746 F. 3d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 2014) 
(“[B]ecause HGC did not represent every Heatherwood homeowner at the time the Agreement between 
HGC and FCB was entered, the implied restrictive covenant could not have been destroyed by the 
Agreement.”); Wood v. Dozier, 464 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 1985) (“Where a purchaser of land intends 
to use it for a purpose not allowed by a restrictive covenant, he should seek to have the deed restriction 
removed before purchasing the property.”); Luani Plaza, Inc. v. Burton, 149 So. 3d 712, 715 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 2014) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment to the Declaration prohibiting residential use of the units . . . was 
properly adopted by the unit owners. Article X, Section 3 of the Declaration provides that it ‘may be 
amended at any time and from time to time upon execution and recordation of an instrument executed 
by the Owners holding not less than four-fifths of the voting interests.’”), reh’g denied (2014), review 
denied, 168 So. 3d 223 (Fla. 2015); Essenson v. Polo Club Assocs., 688 So. 2d 981, 984 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1997) (“[S]ince the agreement was not mutually modified, since any changes in conditions were as a 
result of the actions of Polo Club and since the covenant continues to provide benefits, the court erred in 
entering a summary judgment in favor of Polo Club and should have entered one in favor of Huntley 
Lane Associates.”); Dolphins Plus, Inc. v. Hobdy, 650 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (“The fact 
that the heirs of the developers subsequently gave Dolphins Plus a lease for this purpose does not alter 
this result because, as a matter of law, the lease alone was not sufficient to release or terminate the plat 
restriction.”); AC Assocs. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fla., 453 So. 2d 1121, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); 
Endruschat v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 377 So. 2d 738, 741 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (developer “cannot release 
any restrictions after the property encompassed by any such restrictions has been sold by him”); Balzer 
v. Indian Lake Maint., Inc., 346 So. 2d 146, 147–48 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977) (affirming covenant that would 
“be automatically renewed for each ten year period [after January 1, 1966], unless owners of at least 
two-thirds of the lots in the subdivision known as Indian Lake Estates shall, at least six months prior to 
any such renewal date, agree in writing to a change in or an abrogation of any of the above covenants, 
and record such writing so amending the aforesaid covenants.”); Field Properties, Inc. v. Fritz, 315 So. 
2d 101, 103 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (that subgrantee obtained control of grantor corporation and attempted 
to release deed restrictions was ineffective where deed did not reserve in grantor right to release 
restriction); Johnson v. Three Bays Properties No. 2, Inc., 159 So. 2d 924, 925–26 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) 
(“Appellants did not question appellee’s right to amend the declaration of protective covenants, without 
the consent of the appellants. . . . ‘Words and phrases used in contracts should be given the ordinary and 
commonly understood and accepted meaning.’ The word modify is commonly understood to mean 
alteration or change. Thus alteration or change is not restrictive, it may be characterized, in a 
quantitative sense, as either an increase or decrease.”); Harwick v. Indian Creek Country Club, 142 So. 
2d 128, 129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (“[T]he agreement of 1944 was unenforceable and void because of the 
failure of all the property owners in the subdivision to execute it. . . . Therefore, same did not operate to 
relax the restrictive single family residence restrictions within the subdivision which are still enforceable 
by the appellant.”) (citing Tolar, 96 So. 2d at 554); Batman v. Creighton, 101 So. 2d 587, 590 (Fla. 2d 
DCA 1958) (citing Tolar and holding that “covenants were for the benefit of all the grantees and they 
could enforce them”); McCown v. Gottlieb, 465 So. 2d 1120, 1123 (Ala. 1985) (agreement between 
grantors and one lot owner which purported to release the covenant prohibiting subdivision was 
ineffective and void). 
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or because they are so numerous that their signatures cannot feasibly be 
gathered,81 the law recognizes other alternatives for these instruments. First, 
private covenants are governed by the “rule against unreasonable restraints 
on the use of property,” which “concerns restraints of such duration that 
they prevent the free alienation of property.”82 Private restrictions are thus 
subject to “the test of reasonableness,” and “[t]he validity or invalidity of a 
restraint depends upon its long-term effect on the improvement and 
marketability of the property.”83 And because the law generally discourages 
restraints on the free use of real property, “substantial ambiguity or doubt 
must be resolved against the person claiming the right to enforce the 
covenant.”84 
Equity also permits courts to consider changes in circumstance and to 
determine that it would be unfair to enforce a private covenant. A court of 
equity may “cancel a restrictive covenant in a deed as a cloud on title” 
where it finds that: restrictions “have come to an end because of 
circumstances that have arisen which would show that the purpose for 
which the restrictions were imposed have come to an end”; and “the use of 
the tract of land for whose benefit the restrictions were established has so 
utterly changed that no party . . . could be heard to enforce it in equity, or 
would suffer any damage by the violation of such restrictions.”85 Thus, a 
court of equity could refuse to enforce private restrictions “where the 
equitable enforcement of building restrictions would be oppressive and 
unreasonable because of an entire change in the circumstances and in the 
neighborhood of the property, and the character of the improvements and 
the purposes to which they are applied.”86 
 
81  See, e.g., Wood, 464 So. 2d at 1170; Luani Plaza, 149 So. 3d at 715; Essenson, 688 So. 2d at 
984; Dolphins Plus, 650 So. 2d at 214; AC Assocs., 453 So. 2d at 1130; Endruschat, 377 So. 2d at 741; 
Field Properties, 315 So. 2d at 103; Three Bays Properties No. 2, 159 So. 2d at 925–26; Harwick, 142 
So. 2d at 129; Batman, 101 So. 2d at 590; Tolar, 96 So. 2d at 556; McCown, 465 So. 2d at 1123; In re 
Heatherwood Holdings, 746 F. 3d at 1218. 
82  Iglehart v. Phillips, 383 So. 2d 610, 614 (Fla. 1980). 
83  Id.; see also Seagate Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976) 
(“Our courts have traditionally undertaken to determine the validity of restraints by measuring them in 
terms of their duration, type of alienation precluded, or the size of the class precluded from taking.”). 
84  Washingtonian Apartment Hotel Co. v. Schneider, 75 So. 2d 907, 909 (Fla. 1954) (reversing 
injunction to enforce restriction that was ambiguous); Moore v. Stevens, 106 So. 901, 904 (Fla. 1925). 
85  Osius, 147 So. at 865. 
86  Edgewater Beach Hotel Corp. v. Bishop, 163 So. 214, 216 (Fla. 1935). In Edgewater Beach 
Hotel Corp., the Florida Supreme Court reversed an injunction enforcing a restrictive covenant to 
prohibit the construction of a hotel on Ocean Drive in Miami Beach. The court noted that “the 
restrictions were written at a time when the city of Miami Beach was a small village of between 500 and 
1,000 people” but that the population was then “something like 20,000 people.” Moreover, when Ocean 
Drive was widened, little attention was paid to the deed restrictions, and buildings were erected 
indiscriminately. Additionally, “[t]hose lots, which were evidently designed to accommodate the most 
modest sort of a dwelling to cost around $1,500, are now of such value that to erect such a dwelling on 
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Cancellation of a private covenant is nevertheless an extraordinary 
remedy. The test to determine whether a private restriction remains 
enforceable is  
whether or not the original purpose and intention of the 
parties to such covenant can be reasonably carried out, in 
the light of alleged material changes which are claimed to 
have effectually frustrated their object without fault or 
neglect on the part of the one who seeks to be relieved of 
their observance; 
this test is rooted in “the principle of contract law known as discharge of 
contractual obligation by frustration of contractual object.”87 Moreover, 
judicial modification or cancellation of privately negotiated property 
restrictions is generally disfavored, because “[s]ubstantial uncertainty for 
property owners as to rights and obligations would . . . result . . . if courts, 
at the instance of a suing property owner and over the objection of adjacent 
property owners, could modify or cancel a . . . property restriction.”88 
Once imposed, private covenants can be difficult to dislodge without 
expending significant resources to either obtain the approval of all affected 
 
them would be to indulge in utter foolishness.” Because “[t]he conditions have entirely changed since 
the plat was made and the lots sold by the developers of the subdivision,” the complainant’s remedy 
would not be to enforce the restriction but would at most be in an action at law to recover damages for 
the alleged breach of the covenant. Edgewater Beach Hotel Corp., 163 So. at 216. But see Allen v. 
Avondale Co., 185 So. 137, 138 (Fla. 1938) (“The changes shown to have taken place would ordinarily 
be sufficient to grant relief from enforcing the covenants but it is shown that all these changes took place 
before Appellant purchased his lot; he was therefore on notice of them and all but one were in another 
subdivision.”); Wood v. Dozier, 464 So. 2d 1168, 1169 (Fla. 1985) (affirming continued vitality of 
Avondale holding “that where the owner of property who seeks relief from the enforcement of restrictive 
covenants shall be denied the relief sought when he is on notice that all material changes in the 
neighborhood occurred prior to his purchase of the property”). 
87  Osius, 147 So. at 862; Acopian v. Haley, 387 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (citing 
Barton v. Moline Properties, Inc., 164 So. 551 (Fla. 1935)). Restrictive covenants that do not appear on 
the face of a deed, or in a plat referenced in a deed, may also be subject to extinguishment after 30 years 
under Florida’s Marketable Record Titles to Real Property Act (MRTA), Ch. 712, Fla. Stat. (2017). 
Martin v. Town of Palm Beach, 643 So. 2d 112, 114–15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (“[T]he 1957 deed is the 
root of title, as well as the only muniment of title. . . . [T]he 1957 deed does not contain the use 
restriction set forth in the 1948 deed, but instead only generally states that the conveyance is subject to 
easements, covenants, limitations, reservations, and restrictions of record. Because this language fails to 
comport with the requirements of section 712.03(1), the use restriction contained in the 1948 deed has 
not been preserved.”). 
88  AC Assocs., 453 So. 2d at 1130 (“Substantial uncertainty for property owners as to rights and 
obligations would, we believe, result under circumstances like this if courts, at the instance of a suing 
property owner and over the objection of adjacent property owners, could modify or cancel a 
commercial (or residential) property restriction on the basis that it is unreasonable by reason of a 
different type of commercial (or residential) use planned by the suing property owner. This would 
especially appear to be the case when, as here, the commercial uses of the adjacent property, which is 
the only other property covered by the restriction, have remained the same. As a general rule, property 
owners accommodate to property restrictions, not vice versa.”). 
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property owners or to seek judicial modification or cancellation. For private 
covenants, this may well be a feature, not a bug. But, for covenants 
involving the public zoning process, it poses significant challenges. 
 
III.  SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR ZONING COVENANTS 
 
Restrictive covenants accepted through the zoning process present 
unique considerations.89 First, as the First District determined, covenants 
involving government are not mere legal instruments, but are, rather, 
solemn promises to its citizenry: 
In dealing with its citizenry, the Government is required to 
adhere to the same strict rule of rectitude of conduct and 
the turning of the same square corner as the Government 
requires of its citizens. . . . Just as one by deep deliberation 
may not add “one cubit unto his stature,” even so, the 
Government through the convenient process of legislative 
enactment may not render ineffective by “one jot or one 
tittle,” its solemn covenant with its citizenry.90 
Second, and more significantly, restrictive covenants accepted by a 
zoning authority become something more than solemn promises: they 
become law.91 Thus, zoning covenants not only observe the formalities of 
 
89  This article focuses on restrictive covenants related to rezonings, but governments accept 
restrictive covenants with other zoning actions such as unusual uses, special exceptions, and variances, 
and in other regulatory contexts as well. For example, Miami-Dade County environmental regulations 
permit development of properties containing ecologically sensitive wetlands, subject to restrictions to 
mitigate the environmental impacts of the development.  See Ch. 24, Art. IV, Div. 1, Code of Miami-
Dade County, Fla. One of the mitigation mechanisms the County may employ is to require the owner to 
execute a mitigation covenant over a portion of the property to be developed. Such covenants “restrict 
development or alteration of the property to a designated portion of the property and may include 
conditions for the environmental protection and environmental management of designated portions of 
the property,” and may only be released or modified with the approval of the County. §§ 24-
48.2(I)(B)(2)(b), 24-48.2(II)(B)(10)(c), Code of Miami-Dade County, Fla. Such mitigation is proffered 
pursuant to Florida law when an application for development does not otherwise meet the State’s 
criteria. See, e.g., § 373.414(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017) (“If the applicant is unable to otherwise meet the 
criteria set forth in this subsection, the governing board or the department, in deciding to grant or deny a 
permit, shall consider measures proposed by or acceptable to the applicant to mitigate adverse effects 
that may be caused by the regulated activity. Such measures may include, but are not limited to, onsite 
mitigation, offsite mitigation, offsite regional mitigation, and the purchase of mitigation credits from 
mitigation banks permitted under s. 373.4136. It shall be the responsibility of the applicant to choose the 
form of mitigation. The mitigation must offset the adverse effects caused by the regulated activity.”); 
§ 373.414(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (2017); Fla. Admin. Code R. 62-345.100–62-345.600. 
90  Okaloosa Island Leaseholder’s Ass’n v. Hayes, 362 So. 2d 101, 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978) 
(quoting Matt. 5:19, 6:27 (King James) and citing Daniell v. Sherrill, 48 So. 2d 736, 739 (Fla. 1950)). 
91  Save Calusa Trust v. St. Andrews Holdings, Ltd., 193 So. 3d 910, 915 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) 
(“The restrictive zoning covenant sealed the intent and objectives of the County’s regulation of the golf 
course property. This Court has determined that a ZAB resolution, containing a restrictive covenant, 
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private covenants, but also the law accords them a special status befitting of 
their creation and acceptance as local laws. Courts should thus give the 
same level of deference to zoning covenants as they give to other 
regulations.92 
In Metropolitan Dade County v. Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 
So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), the Third District explained the legal 
status of covenants accepted in conjunction with zoning approvals. In that 
case, the property owners had nearly completed constructing a gas station 
when the County discovered that it had issued the permit in error: the 
resolution rezoning the property to a commercial district had been approved 
subject to acceptance of a covenant restricting the use of the property to a 
bank or savings and loan.93 Indeed, the covenant had never been recorded, 
but the rezoning resolution “clearly expressed that the county commission 
granted rezoning only for a bank or savings and loan.”94 The Court held that 
property owners have constructive notice of the generic zoning regulations 
in the applicable zoning ordinances, the zoning resolutions adopted for the 
specific property and, significantly, the terms of covenants accepted in 
connection with zoning resolutions: “[T]he public is on notice that . . . 
[zoning] resolutions which are passed subsequent to public hearing can 
modify districts and restrict property use; and that the rights of property 
owners can thus be limited.”95 The court further held that it was “illegal” to 
violate the terms of the zoning covenant, thereby recognizing that zoning 
resolutions and attendant conditions or covenants are, in effect, local laws.96 
An earlier Third District decision explored the interplay between the 
law governing restrictive covenants and the law of zoning. In Norwood-
Norland Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1987), the court heard an appeal from a decision to rezone certain 
property around Dolphin Stadium, and to release that property from a 
previously-accepted zoning covenant. The covenant, accepted by the 
County in 1977, restricted the property to lower density uses like a park or a 
school, and contained the following modification clause: 
This Agreement may be modified, amended, or released as 
to any portion of the land described herein by a written 
instrument executed by the then-owner of the fee-simple 
 
constitutes a governmental regulation with the force of law.”); Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 
2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“Such a restriction on the property’s use which was made in the 
public interest became binding upon the property,” and violation of the covenant’s use restriction 
“would be illegal.”). 
92  See infra Part IV. 
93  Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
94  Id. at 1007–08. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
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title to the lands to be affected by such modification, 
amendment or release, along with a majority of the 
property owners within 350 ft. of the property for which 
such modification is proposed, as well as along with a 
majority of the property within 350 ft. of the property 
shown in the Plan, and approved after public hearing by 
Resolution of the Board of County Commissioners or 
Zoning Appeals Board of Metropolitan Dade County, 
Florida, whichever by law has jurisdiction over such 
subject matter.97 
The petitioners contended that the County had not followed the terms 
of the covenant in approving the rezoning, because the County had allowed 
the developers to reduce the rezoning area and thereby eliminate the need to 
seek consent from property owners beyond that reduced radius.98 The 
petitioners also contended that the County had violated the majority vote 
requirement, because it allowed affected property owners to vote based on 
the number of parcels they owned; they contended that it should have been 
one vote per owner, not one vote per parcel.99 
Notably, the court considered the covenant issue as part of the zoning 
appeal, not in an original action seeking enforcement of the covenant. But, 
while the issue arose in an appeal of the zoning resolution, the court 
nevertheless looked principally to the express terms of the modification 
clause in the covenant. The court held that “drawing the lines in by 351 feet 
to obtain a majority vote [was] in full compliance with the restrictive 
covenant,” as the modification clause allowed for the covenant to be 
released as to only a portion of the subject property.100 As for the tabulation 
of majority votes, the court looked to Florida law on private restrictive 
covenants, which held that private covenants are to be “strictly construed in 
favor of the free and unrestricted use of property” and that ambiguous terms 
are to be “resolved against the party claiming the right to enforce the 
restriction.”101 The court observed that “the provisions for release of the 
restrictive covenant are susceptible to different interpretations” and that 
there “was no evidence in the record as to the parties’ intentions in drafting 
the covenant.”102 The court affirmed tabulation as one vote per parcel, 
because, under those facts, that interpretation was “consistent with the 
 
97  Norwood-Norland Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d 1009, 1011 (Fla. 3d 
DCA 1987). 
98  Id. at 1013. 
99  Id. 
100 Id. at 1014. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
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pronounced policy against land restrictions.”103 But the latter was a curious 
conclusion, because, had several owners of multiple parcels instead been 
against the change, then, under the court’s interpretation, the result would 
have been to defeat the change and to retain the land restrictions. 
Norwood-Norland is significant because it showed the court 
recognizing the hybrid nature of zoning covenants: the covenant’s specific 
terms may be reviewed by analogy to the standards applicable to private 
restrictive covenants, but that review takes place within the process for 
review of zoning actions. This method of reviewing a regulatory zoning 
covenant is consistent with the principles that regulatory covenants are a 
form of local law104 and, as local laws, are entitled to the deference afforded 
to local regulations under the police power.105 
The Third District further examined the interplay between the law 
governing private covenants and the law of zoning in its en banc opinion in 
Metro. Dade Cnty. v. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). 
Sunlink concerned a 1974 covenant recorded by AT&T to induce the 
County to rezone its property from residential use to light industrial use.106 
Because the subject property was surrounded by residential uses, the 
covenant restricted the industrially-zoned properties so that the property 
could only be conveyed to “entities owned, controlled by, or affiliated with 
the Owner [AT&T].”107 The covenant further provided that the restrictions 
would run for thirty years, with automatic ten-year extensions, 
unless an instrument signed by a majority of the then 
owner(s) of the real property and a majority of those within 
500 feet of the boundary of the property has been recorded, 
agreeing to change the covenants in whole or in part, 
providing the covenants have first been released by the 
Commission.108 
In 1989, the nature of the telecommunications industry had changed so 
significantly that Sunlink, which had received the property from the 
divestiture of AT&T, no longer needed the property and sought to sell it—
but the zoning covenant impeded the sale.109 Rather than pursuing a zoning 
application in compliance with the modification clause, as was done in 
Norwood-Norland, Sunlink filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to 
 
103 Norwood-Norland Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d 1009, 1014. 
104  Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). 
105  See infra Part IV. 
106  Metro. Dade Cty. v. Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d 551, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), on reh’g (Feb. 
2, 1993). 
107  Id. at 551–52. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. at 552. 
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invalidate the covenant based on changed circumstances and unreasonable 
restraint of alienation110––theories that can be used to extinguish private 
restrictions.111 The trial court had granted judgment in favor of Sunlink, but 
the Third District reversed. 
The appellate court considered the factors for unreasonable restraint 
claims––namely the duration of the restraint, the type of alienation 
precluded, and the size of the precluded class.112 The court determined the 
term to be reasonable, because it was subject to cancellation or modification 
with the written consent of the neighbors. As to the type of alienation 
precluded, the court––relying on Fontainebleau Gas & Wash––held that 
“unmarketability” was not the proper consideration for a covenant “created 
and recorded to preserve the nature of the neighborhood and to induce the 
county to change the zoning classification.”113 The court further held that 
the covenant “continues to preserve the character of the neighborhood and 
is therefore ‘reasonable when judged in view of the justifiable expectations 
of the parties.’”114 Finally, as to the size of the precluded class, the Court 
held that it was not unlimited or absolute––and therefore not 
unreasonable—because if AT&T or Sunlink “wish[ed] to remove or modify 
the restrictive covenant, they can follow the steps outlined in the 
Declaration of Restrictive Covenants.”115 The en banc panel thus directed 
Sunlink “to seek release from the covenant by the mechanism prescribed in 
the covenant itself,”116 namely the zoning process and the neighbors’ 
written consents. 
Especially noteworthy about Sunlink is the Court’s reliance on the 
zoning purpose of the covenant within the traditional framework for equity 
review of private covenant modifications The covenant could be subject to 
further attack, but that challenge would likely have to originate in an appeal 
of a zoning decision implicating the terms of the covenant, as was done in 
Norwood-Norland. 
The interplay between private covenant law and zoning law is further 
illustrated in the recent decision of Save Calusa Trust v. St. Andrews 
Holdings, Ltd., 193 So. 3d 910, 916 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), reh’g denied 
(June 6, 2016), review denied, SC16-1189, 2016 WL 7474142 (Fla. Dec. 
 
110  Id. 
111  See supra Part II. 
112  Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 551, 553–56 (Jorgenson, J., dissenting; adopted as the opinion 
of the en banc court). 
113  Id. at 553–56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (Jorgenson, J., dissenting; adopted as the opinion of the en 
banc court). 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 556. 
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29, 2016). That case concerned, not a rezoning, but an “unusual use” zoning 
approval for a golf course and country club use. Consistent with Hartnett, 
that is the type of site-specific application that could be subject to site-
specific conditions (without a covenant) without constituting either contract 
zoning or conditional zoning.117 A covenant would therefore not have been 
necessary. But, in that context, covenants serve to further solemnize the 
applicant’s representations to induce approval. They also serve as a form of 
super-notice to anyone acquiring an interest in the property, because the 
covenant is recorded in the public records and should be found in a search of 
the property’s chain of title.118 The analysis in Save Calusa Trust is 
nevertheless instructive, because the terms of the Calusa covenant are 
similar to those of covenants that have accompanied rezonings.119  
In Calusa, one of the conditions in the zoning resolution was “[t]hat 
restrictive covenants running with the land in proper covenant form, 
meeting with the approval of the Zoning Director, be recorded to ensure 
that the golf course be perpetually maintained as such.”120 The covenant 
that the developer recorded in 1968 provided: 
The aforedescribed property may only be used for the 
following purposes: 
 
A golf course and for the operation of a country club which 
may include a clubhouse, pro shop, locker rooms, 
swimming pools, cabanas, liquor, beer and wine facilities, 
dining room facilities, parking, tennis courts, putting 




117  Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 1956) (“[T]he applicant [ ] was not appealing to a 
Board of Adjustment for a variance on the basis of any hardship. . . . What we have here held might not 
be applicable to a proper application for a variance by an owner based on hardship.”). Zoning covenants 
are not just used with rezonings. They may be used with other types of applications, such as variances, 
special exceptions, and unusual uses. Consistent with Hartnett, those types of zoning actions may be 
subject to special conditions, so a covenant would not be necessary. But, in that context, covenants serve 
to further solemnize the applicant’s representations to induce approval. They also serve as a form of 
super-notice to anyone acquiring an interest in the property, because the covenant is recorded in the 
public records and should be found in a search of the property’s chain of title. See First Am. Title Ins. 
Co. of St. Lucie Cty., Inc. v. Dixon, 603 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (“By statute, the clerk is 
required to record, index, and maintain documents relating to real property in the public records.”); 
§ 28.222, Fla. Stat. (2017). 
118  See First Am. Title Ins. Co. of St. Lucie Cty., Inc. v. Dixon, 603 So. 2d 562, 564 (Fla. 4th 
DCA 1992) (“By statute, the clerk is required to record, index, and maintain documents relating to 
real property in the public records.”); § 28.222, Fla. Stat. (2017). 
119  See, for example Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 551 and Norwood-Norland Homeowners’ 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 511 So. 2d at 1009. 
120  Save Calusa Trust, 193 So. 3d at 912.  
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These restrictions shall continue for a period of ninety-nine 
years unless released or revised by the Board of County 
Commissioners of the County of Dade, State of Florida, or 
its successors with the consent of 75% of the members of 
the corporation owning the aforedescribed property and 
those owners within 150 feet of the exterior boundaries of 
the aforedescribed property.121 
In 2012, the successor owners of the golf course sought to redevelop it but 
were unable to obtain the required consents of the surrounding 
homeowners. 
When County staff determined that a zoning application could not be 
processed until the owners obtained the homeowners’ consents, the owners 
filed a quiet title action seeking to, among other claims, invalidate the 
zoning covenant under Florida’s Marketable Record Title Act (“MRTA”). 
The owners claimed that the zoning covenant was an “estate or interest in, 
or a claim or charge to, title to real property,” and could therefore be 
extinguished under MRTA without following the zoning process.122 The 
Third District rejected this argument. Instead, the court determined that a 
zoning covenant is a form of zoning regulation, not an encumbrance on or 
defect that affects the marketability of title to real property, and it is thus 
not subject to MRTA.123 Still at issue is whether the covenant remains 
enforceable under the analysis conducted in Sunlink and Norwood-Norland. 
Consistent with those decisions, the Third District provided a framework 
for further analysis in the zoning context; the court noted that “whether 
changed circumstances exist to warrant cancellation of the covenant and 
whether the covenant constitutes an unlawful restraint on alienation” could 
be “addressed as matters preliminary to a proposed re-zoning.”124 Left 
unspecified is: whether that determination could be made through a zoning 
resolution appealed through the certiorari review process for quasi-judicial 
decisions;125 or whether that determination must be made by a trial court in 
 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at 911. 
123  Id. at 912. In the 2017 legislative session, the Florida Legislature considered a bill to add 
zoning covenants to the list of interests extinguished by MRTA. See H.B. 735, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess., 
(Fla. 2017); S.B. 1046, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2017). But the bill was not adopted, so the Save 
Calusa Trust decision remains the final word on this issue. 
124  Save Calusa Trust, 193 So. 3d at 916 n.12. 
125  See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(c)(2); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 
1092 (Fla. 2000) (“Although termed ‘certiorari’ review, review at this level is not discretionary but 
rather is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal.”); Norwood-Norland 
Homeowners’ Ass’n, 511 So. 2d at 1011. But cf. Baker v. Metro. Dade Cty., 774 So. 2d 14, 19, 20 n.13 
(Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that a quasi-judicial board cannot modify the application of the 
comprehensive plan to a zoning application on grounds of fundamental fairness––even where the 
ordinance governing the comprehensive plan references the need to consider fundamental fairness when 
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a declaratory action.126 
One thing is clear, based on the zoning covenants whose enforceability 
was affirmed in Norwood-Norland, Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, and 
Sunlink: covenants can lawfully be used to tailor a rezoning to the 
surrounding neighborhood. But that method of tailoring comes with 
additional complexities. In a straightforward zoning matter, an application 
is filed, a hearing is held, interested parties can make their views heard, the 
government makes a decision, and an appellate court can review it. 
Covenants insert novel ownership and consent issues into that process, by 
also subjecting the decision to the consent of interested parties whose 
consent might not otherwise be required for rezoning application.127  
It would be better for Florida to simply allow conditional rezoning, so 
that zoning boards have a greater range of options to address the impacts of 
redevelopment and balance the property rights of zoning applicants with the 
property rights of neighbors. If conditional rezoning were explicitly 
 
applying the comprehensive plan––because “‘[f]undamental fairness’ questions are judicial ones, within 
the jurisdiction of the courts”; and an administrative agency has no power “to determine the illegality or 
unconstitutionality of legislation,” namely the comprehensive plan provisions that apply to the 
property); Dade Cty. v. Overstreet, 59 So. 2d 862, 865 (Fla. 1952) (“The proposed location of a liquor 
store . . . or similar questions under the Statutes or under zoning ordinances or resolutions of a County or 
City, should be challenged on the ground that such Statutes, ordinances or resolutions with reference 
thereto are illegal or unconstitutional; the same should not and cannot be adjudicated by the Beverage 
Director . . . as these are clearly judicial questions for determination by the Circuit Courts under Section 
11 of Article V of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.”). 
126  See Sunlink Corp., 642 So. 2d at 553–56. Declaratory judgment claims seeking to invalidate 
the Calusa covenant on grounds of “unlawful restraint on alienation” and of “material change in 
circumstance” remain pending in the underlying litigation. Amended Complaint, St. Andrews Holdings, 
Ltd. v. Morot-Gaudry, No. 12-33641 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 29, 2012). 
127 Covenants requiring the consent of neighbors have been repeatedly affirmed and given the 
status of local laws, see supra Part III, but no case has specifically addressed the interaction between a 
local law that subjects modification or release to the approval of third parties and either the general 
prohibition on unlawful delegations of the police power, see supra note 29, or the First Amendment 
right “to complain to public officials and to seek administrative and judicial relief from their actions,” 
Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F. 3d 83, 91 (2d Cir. 2002). On the 
other hand, Florida courts have consistently affirmed, as complying with due process, zoning regulations 
that require zoning approvals to be submitted to the voters in a referendum. See, e.g., Fla. Land Co. v. 
City of Winter Springs, 427 So. 2d 170, 174 (Fla. 1983) (“The wisdom of this decision may be 
questioned in that all zoning changes made in this fashion are subject to the whims of a referendum and 
to the vicissitudes of the electorate. The other side of the coin is that this is a power that the people have 
reserved. If the people of Winter Springs choose to give up the power and pass it over solely to a zoning 
body, that they may do. But that they have not done, and this Court cannot and will not do it for them.”); 
Vill. of Palmetto Bay v. Alexander Sch., Inc., 3D16-1201, 2017 WL 1018495, at *3 (Fla. 3d DCA Mar. 
15, 2017) (“Charter provisions such as Section 10.1 that allow some decisions to be made by voter 
referendum do not violate due process rights.”). As such, a covenant requiring the approval of neighbors 
within a certain radius could be construed as the equivalent of a referendum requirement, albeit of only a 
segment of the electorate; cf. Miami-Dade County Home Rule Charter, § 7.02 (providing for referendum 
on lease or disposition of mini or neighborhood park and requiring affirmative vote by “a majority of the 
residents residing in voting precincts any part of which is within 1 mile of the park [to] authorize such 
sale or lease by majority vote in an election.”). 
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allowed, then, as explained below, the current law governing judicial 
review of rezoning decisions would provide sufficient protection against the 
arbitrary and capricious use of the police power that had concerned Florida 
courts when they limited conditional rezoning. 
 
IV. ZONING DECISIONS AS QUASI-JUDICIAL ACTS 
 
Zonings and rezonings were historically the only zoning actions to 
have been considered legislative acts. But zoning boards also consider 
applications for variances, conditional uses, special exceptions, unusual 
uses, and other exceptions, reviews, and interpretations of zoning 
ordinances. The Florida Supreme Court had distinguished rezonings from 
variances or exceptions as follows: “rezoning ordinarily contemplates a 
change in existing zoning rules and regulations within a district, subdivision 
or other comparatively large area in a given governmental unit, which 
theretofore has been uniformly zoned in its entirety.”128 By contrast, “the 
granting of a variance or exception usually contemplates only . . . 
permitting a non-conforming use in order to alleviate undue burden or 
‘unnecessary hardship’ upon the property owner which the zoning rules and 
regulations otherwise impose.”129 And Hartnett further recognized that 
flexibility, and hence site-specific conditions, could be appropriate in the 
context of applications “appealing to a Board of Adjustment for a variance 
on the basis of any hardship” rather than “seeking an outright change in the 
zoning ordinance by amendment.”130 
These other types of zoning actions––in contrast to zonings and 
rezonings––have always been considered “quasi-judicial.”131 A quasi-
judicial proceeding is an administrative or local board proceeding in which 
the board’s action is contingent on notice, an opportunity to be heard, the 
presentation of evidence, and a requirement that the board’s judgment be 
based on the showing made at the hearing.132 Moreover, unlike legislative 
 
128  Troup v. Bird, 53 So. 2d 717, 720 (Fla. 1951). 
129  Id. 
130  Hartnett v. Austin, 93 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 1956); see also J. C. Vereen & Sons, Inc. v. City of 
Miami, 397 So. 2d 979, 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (“Where, however, as here, a party seeks a variance 
and not a change or amendment in the zoning ordinance and there is no contracting away of police 
power, the deed or contract will be upheld.”). 
131  See, e.g., Sun Ray Homes, Inc. v. Dade Cty., 166 So. 2d 827, 829 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) (“In 
the instant case the action of the Board of County Commissioners was clearly quasi-judicial because it 
was a review of an interpretation and application of an ordinance by the Zoning Appeals Board. The 
ordinance in question is valid as applied to the facts of this case.”); Alachua County. v. Eagle’s Nest 
Farms, Inc., 473 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“Since the special use permit, as defined by the 
zoning regulations, is more analogous to a special exception than a rezoning, the denial or issuance of a 
special use permit is essentially an administrative function [rather than a legislative function].”). 
132  De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 915 (Fla. 1957) (en banc) (holding that Civil Service 
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matters, lobbying of board members on quasi-judicial matters is generally 
prohibited for the same reasons that ex parte communications would be 
prohibited in a court of law.133 
Quasi-judicial actions are distinguished both from purely executive 
actions—in which decisions are, with certain exceptions, not subject to a 
hearing or to judicial review134—and from legislative actions—which often 
involve the establishment of a general policy and which do not require 
sworn testimony or evidence or a closed record presented at a hearing.135 
These distinctions among executive, legislative, and quasi-judicial functions 
are rooted in the Constitutional separation of powers.136 The Florida 
Supreme Court has admonished courts to refrain from interfering in the 
actions of a co-equal branch of government: “Promiscuous intervention by 
the courts in the affairs of these administrative agencies except for most 
urgent reasons would inevitably result in the dethronement of the 
commissions and the substitution of the courts in their place and stead.”137 
The Florida Supreme Court has further pronounced, “Judicial intervention 
 
Board termination proceeding was quasi-judicial). 
133  Jennings v. Miami-Dade Cty., 589 So. 2d 1337, 1341 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (citations omitted) 
(“Ex parte communications are inherently improper and are anathema to quasi-judicial proceedings. . . . 
However, we recognize the reality that commissioners are elected officials in which capacity they may 
unavoidably be the recipients of unsolicited ex parte communications regarding quasi-judicial matters 
they are to decide. The occurrence of such a communication in a quasi-judicial proceeding does not 
mandate automatic reversal. Nevertheless, we hold that the allegation of prejudice resulting from ex 
parte contacts with the decision makers in a quasi-judicial proceeding states a cause of action. Upon the 
aggrieved party’s proof that an ex parte contact occurred, its effect is presumed to be prejudicial unless 
the defendant proves the contrary by competent evidence.”). In response to that decision, the Florida 
Legislature adopted section 286.0115, Florida Statute, which purports to “remov[e] the presumption of 
prejudice from ex parte communications.” No court has directly reviewed that statute, but at least one 
court called into doubt the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance adopted pursuant to 
section 286.0115 that purported to remove the presumption of prejudice for ex parte communications. 
See Palmer Trinity Private Sch., Inc. v. Vill. of Palmetto Bay, Florida, 802 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (S.D. 
Fla. 2011) (noting that a municipal ordinance that “creates a scheme that is directly contrary to the 
framework laid out in Jennings. . . . has never been interpreted by Florida courts, and it is unclear if [the 
ordinance] stands up to Florida constitutional scrutiny in light of Jennings.”). 
134  De Groot, 95 So. 2d at 916 (providing an example of non-reviewable, “purely executive” 
judgment as removal of an employee from office “where one holds office at the pleasure of the 
appointing power and the power of appointment is coupled with the power of removal contingent only 
on the exercise of personal judgment by the appointing authority”). 
135  See Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963); see Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 
Brevard Cty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993). 
136  At the local government level, the separation of powers doctrine relates to the relationship 
between the local government and the judiciary, not an internal separation of powers within the local 
government itself. For counties and municipalities, the constitutional doctrine of a separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of government does not exist. See Citizens for Reform v. 
Citizens for Open Gov’t, Inc., 931 So. 2d 977, 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (“[T]he concept of 
Constitutional separation of powers simply does not exist at the local government level.”) (citations 
omitted). 
137  Odham v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 128 So. 2d 586, 593 (Fla. 1961). 
02-KERBEL 5.9.17.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/20/17  6:15 PM 
2017] Restrictive Covenants  293 
in the decision-making function of the executive branch must be restrained 
in order to support the integrity of the administrative process and to allow 
the executive branch to carry out its responsibilities as a co-equal branch of 
government.”138 
Appellate review of quasi-judicial decisions respects the separation of 
powers, albeit in a different application than the “fairly debatable” standard 
that governs review of legislative actions. Quasi-judicial decisions are 
reviewed by petition for writ of certiorari. “[T]he reviewing court will not 
undertake to re-weigh or evaluate the evidence presented before the tribunal 
or agency whose order is under examination.”139 Instead, the appellate court 
“merely examines the record below” to determine whether the lower 
tribunal provided procedural due process, acted in accord with “the 
essential requirements of the law,” and “had before it competent substantial 
evidence to support its findings and judgment.”140 “Competent substantial 
evidence” means “that the evidence relied upon to sustain the ultimate 
finding should be sufficiently relevant and material that a reasonable mind 
would accept it as adequate to support the conclusion reached.”141 
Over the years, the Florida Supreme Court clarified the scope of 
certiorari review of quasi-judicial local government decisions: “Although 
termed ‘certiorari’ review, review at this level is not discretionary but rather 
is a matter of right and is akin in many respects to a plenary appeal.”142 The 
review is plenary in that the court must review the matter and not simply 
decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.143 But the court does not 
actually decide the underlying merits of the controversy: the court may at 
most quash the administrative order and “leave the subject matter, that is, 
the controversy pending before the tribunal, commission, or administrative 
authority, as if no order or judgment had been entered.”144 
Because rezonings were long considered legislative, the only process 
that was due was the process attendant to the adoption of ordinances or 
 
138  Key Haven Associated Enter., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Internal Imp. Trust Fund, 427 So. 2d 
153, 157 (Fla. 1982) (emphasis added); see also Pushkin v. Lombard, 279 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1973) (citing Odham and reversing trial court that “allowed the plaintiffs to by-pass and interfere with 
the orderly administrative proceedings of the ‘Board’” because plaintiffs are required “to exhaust their 
administrative remedies before attempting to invoke the scrutiny of the court”). 
139  De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912, 916 (Fla. 1957). 
140  Id. 
141  Id. 
142  Fla. Power & Light Co. v. City of Dania, 761 So. 2d 1089, 1092 (Fla. 2000). 
143  Id. 
144  Tamiami Trail Tours v. R.R. Comm’n, 174 So. 451, 454 (Fla. 1937) (“The appellate court has 
no power when exercising its jurisdiction in certiorari to enter a judgment on the merits of the 
controversy under consideration, nor to direct the respondent to enter any particular order or 
judgment.”). 
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resolutions generally.145 But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, questions 
arose as to the true nature of a rezoning hearing and the procedural and 
judicial review standards that should apply to it.146 Finally, in the landmark 
ruling of Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, the 
Florida Supreme Court resolved the issue. The court decided that rezonings 
that  
have an impact on a limited number of persons or property 
owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where the 
decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from 
distinct alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the 
decision can be functionally viewed as policy application, 
rather than policy setting 
are considered to be “quasi-judicial action,” and such rezoning actions are 
“properly reviewable by petition for certiorari.”147  
Furthermore, the courts’ historic concerns for the “uniformity” of a 
zoning scheme148 are largely addressed by the statutory requirement that all 
local governments adopt a comprehensive plan with a future land use plan 
 
145  But, in Miami-Dade County, rezonings had long been treated as quasi-judicial applications, 
based on the County’s unique procedure of taking action on rezonings by resolution rather than by 
ordinance. See Baker v. Metro. Dade Cty., 237 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970) (“The commission’s 
procedure, i.e., utilizing the resolution as a means of denying the request for rezoning, is quasi-judicial 
in nature and certiorari was the proper remedy for review of such quasi-judicial proceeding.”) (citing 
Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)); Metro. Dade Cty. v. Greenlee, 213 So. 2d 485, 486 
(Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (“Such a separate suit would not be appropriate to review the resolution of the 
county commission sought there on grounds other than a general challenge of invalidity of the zoning 
ordinance.”); Land Corp. of Fla. v. Metro. Dade Cty., 204 So. 2d 222, 224 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) (“The 
separate suit filed in this case did not present an attack on the validity of the zoning ordinance, and for 
that reason the case of Thompson v. City of Miami, Fla. 1964, 167 So. 2d 841 is not applicable. Here the 
challenge was to the county commission’s ruling for which review by certiorari is prescribed by s 33-
316 of the Code of Ordinances of Metropolitan Dade County.”); Dade Cty. v. Metro Imp. Corp., 190 So. 
2d 202, 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (“Under the provisions of Section 33-315 of the Charter, action taken 
by the County Commission sitting as an appellate board for one of the lower echelon zoning authorities 
is final action. The Commission may, at its discretion, do three things other than taking final action as 
defined in Section 33-315, (1) it may defer action on a matter before it in order to inspect the site in 
question; (2) it may refer the matter back to the zoning appeal board for further consideration and 
recommendation; (3) it may refer the matter to any department for its recommendation but when Final 
action in the nature of rezoning, or a denial of rezoning, is taken by the Board, then the next procedural 
step is judicial review.”). 
146  See, e.g., Snyder v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty., 595 So. 2d 65, 73 (Fla. 5th DCA 
1991) (expressing the view that “rezoning is granted not solely on the basis of the land’s suitability to 
the new zoning classification and compatibility with the use of surrounding acreage, but, also, and 
perhaps foremost, on local political considerations including who the owner is, who the objectors are, 
the particular and exact land improvement and use that is intended to be made and whose ox is being 
fattened or gored by the granting or denial of the rezoning request”). 
147  Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Brevard Cty. v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474–75 (Fla. 1993) (quoting 
Fifth District Court of Appeal decision). 
148   See supra Part I. 
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map to address “proposed future general distribution, location, and extent of 
the uses of land for residential uses, commercial uses, industry, agriculture, 
recreation, conservation, education, public facilities, and other categories of 
the public and private uses of land.”149 Comprehensive plans and plan 
amendments are legislative decisions (subject to administrative review), but 
the statute requires all land development regulations and development orders 
to be consistent with the comprehensive plan.150 
Unfortunately, the court has not gone further to revisit the precedents it 
had established when rezoning was considered to be a legislative act and 
did not receive the procedural safeguards of quasi-judicial hearings. But is 
now clear that rezoning decisions, like other zoning actions, are held to a 
higher due process standard than other local government decisions.151 And 
it is clear that zoning decisions that affect discrete parcels or interests are 
quasi-judicial and not legislative in character. Accordingly, a clear vehicle 





Permitting conditional rezonings outright would give greater options to 
local governments in tailoring zoning decisions to surrounding areas 
without having to either rewrite their zoning codes or rely on applicants to 
proffer restrictive covenants and then deal with the collateral ownership, 
modification, and enforceability issues that may arise. The quasi-judicial 
zoning hearing process and attendant right to judicial review provide 
sufficient protections against arbitrary and capricious rezoning actions. 
Moreover, Fontainebleau Gas & Wash enforced the terms of a covenant 
that had never actually been recorded; what mattered to the court was that 
the terms of the restriction had been expressed on the face of the 
resolution.152 Thus, it was constructive notice—not of instruments in the 
chain of title—but of zoning regulations on file with the zoning department, 
that gave life to that restriction.153 It is time to revisit Hartnett v. Austin’s 
 
149  § 163.3177(6)(a), Fla. Stat. 
150  § 163.3194(1), Fla. Stat. 
151  See id. at 474 (holding that a local government decision that “determines the rules of law 
applicable, and the rights affected by them, in relation to past transactions” is a quasi-judicial decision; 
“legislative action results in the formulation of a general rule of policy, whereas judicial action results in 
the application of a general rule of policy.”); Jennings, 589 So. 2d at 1340. 
152  Fontainebleau Gas & Wash, Inc., 570 So. 2d 1006, 1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“A preamble 
to the zoning resolution clearly expressed that the county commission granted rezoning only for a bank 
or savings and loan and accepted the property owner’s offer of a restrictive covenant and the county’s 
option to enforce this restriction. No such restrictive covenant was ever recorded.”). 
153  Id. at 1007–08. 
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emphasis on a uniform Euclidean system and to fully embrace conditional 
rezoning. 
 
